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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5298
This paper sheds light on an implicit dimension of 
the climate policy debate: the extent to which supply-
side response (emission-reducing energy technologies) 
may substitute for the transformation of consumption 
behavior and thus help get around the political difficulties 
surrounding such behavioral transformation. The paper 
performs a meta-review of long-term energy forecasts 
since the end of the 1960s in order to put in perspective 
the controversies around technological optimism about 
the potential for cheap, large-scale, carbon-free energy 
production.
   This retrospective analysis encompasses 116 scenarios 
conducted over 36 years and analyzes their predictions 
for a) fossil fuels, b) nuclear energy, and c) renewable 
energy. The analysis demonstrates how the predicted 
This paper—prepared as a background paper to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2010: Development in a 
Changing Climate—is a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the World Bank or its affiliated organizations. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at nadaud@centre-cired.fr.
relative shares of these three types of energy have evolved 
since 1970, for two cases: a) predicted shares in 2010, 
which shows how the initial outlooks for the 2000–2010 
period have been revised as a function of observed trends; 
and b) predicted shares for t+30, which shows how these 
revisions have affected medium-term prospects.
   The analysis shows a decrease, since 1970, in 
technological optimism about switching away from 
fossil fuels; this decrease is unsurprisingly correlated 
with a decline in modelers’ beliefs in the suitability 
of nuclear energy. But, after a trend of increasing 
optimism, a declining trend also characterizes renewable 
energies in the 1980s and 1990s before a slight revival 
of technological optimism about renewables in the 
aftermath of Kyoto.   
Thirty-five years of long-run energy forecasting: 
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Introduction 
One of the implicit dimensions of the climate policy debate is the extent to which supply-based 
responses may substitute for demand-side efforts. These efforts indeed are perceived as requiring 
transformations of individual and collective behaviors, and technological optimism on the 
decarbonization of the energy supply is a way of getting round the political difficulties of 
demand-side policies. 
The difficulty in evaluating the potential of supply-side responses is that, at any point in time, any 
such assessment depends on technological forecasts which are necessarily self-fulfilling in nature. 
But at the same time, the forecasts are indicative of the global outlook that prevails when they are 
elaborated. 
Therefore, in order to put into perspective the controversies between technological optimism and 
pessimism, the following meta-review performs a retrospective analysis of past (and recent) 
forecasts to reveal the long-run trends in the outlook of experts about the potential of future 
energy options to go out of fossil based energies. It conducts a comparative assessment of world 
and US energy forecast studies. The main reason why the US is singled out is that US-focused 
studies are the only ones whose geographic scope does not vary from year to year. For example, 
in the global studies, Japan is alternately aggregated with the “rest of OECD” or with other 
industrialized Asian nations. Furthermore, the definition of Europe varies across studies and over 
time from six member states to twenty-seven today. 
A total of 32 studies have been selected,
2 encompassing 116 scenarios in which we compute the 
relative shares of primary energy in three groups of primary energy sources: 
  nuclear energy; 
  renewable energy (RE), excluding biomass and traditional energy; 
  fossil fuels. 
All studies deliver a finer level of detail on renewable energies (e.g. biomass, hydraulic or wind) 
and on the breakdown of primary energy from different sources (coal, oil, gas). A more aggregate 
analysis is unfortunately needed to secure the comparability of a larger sample of studies. But the 
price to pay for this aggregation is not so high, given that what matters is less to describe the 
precise composition of the energy portfolio than to capture the structural expected shifts in the 
primary energy supply, with a focus on fossil fuels and within the substitutes to fossil fuels the 
main and politically sensitive difference between nuclear energies and other carbon free energies. 
The main challenge in comparing studies conducted over a period of about 36 years is that their 
forecasts cover different time periods. To overcome these difficulties and make the best use of the 
material we defined two presentation modes: 
(1) Relative shares in 2010: We interpolated (and extrapolated for the few studies of the 
early seventies which very often covered year 2000) the projected values in each study for 
2010. This date made it possible to use the maximum of carried out studies with the same 
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target year of 2000, which allows for comparison with the studies carried out in later years 
that forecasted beyond 2010. 
(2) Relative shares in t+30 years from the year of reference in each study: This indicator 
allows for capturing the implementation lag of any major energy policy shift, given the 
diffusion/maturation period of the underlying technologies. How the t+30 indicators 
evolve made it also possible to assess the trends for a given technical change (i.e., 30 
years ahead). 
The first section presents our chosen methodology and details of the data processing step. Section 
two presents our main results, with the support of detailed graphs. Section three derives some 
general lessons of interest in the reflection about the nature of any energy forecast. 
1) Methodology 
In this section we describe the method used to compute the results. Note that this study comes 
along with a data spreadsheet file that may allow the reader to reproduce our results or work out 
their own. 
1.1) Energy unit conversion 
Different scenarios often use various energy units. For example, US scenarios most often use the 
Quadrillion BTU (Quad), or sometimes the Million Barrel per Day (mbd), while the Shell 
company scenarios use Exa Joules, and the book Energy for a Sustainable World uses a seldom 
used unit related to generation capacity (i.e., Tw.yr). For comparison purposes it was deemed 
preferable to convert the original scenarios’ energy units into a unique and homogeneous unit. 
Therefore, all energy units were converted into Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) using 
conversion coefficients from the American Physics Society website
3 which is retained in the 
IEA’s annual World Energy Outlook reports results in Mtoe and in the IPCC emission scenarios. 
1.2) Scope of scenarios and use of median shares 
The different studies provide a set of contrasted scenarios. Instead of picking a few scenarios in 
each of them more or less arbitrarily, we retained all of them when possible.
4 However, we took 
the median shares across all the recorded scenarios (i.e., primary energy shares for nuclear, RE 
and fossil fuels, in 2010 and t+30). This avoids the drawback of conferring to each study a weight 
directly proportional to its number of alternative scenarios and to increase the results variance as 
a simple consequence of the fact that computation capabilities increased over time, as did the 
belief that the objective of energy forecasting lies less in predicting the future than in clarifying 
the field of possibilities.  
The motivation for using the median share stems from the fact that it is a more robust statistic 
than the conventional arithmetic mean. Concerning the SRES scenarios, we considered not the 
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whole set of scenarios published around each basic storyline, but results from the six marker 
model runs carried out by the core teams involved. 
1.3) “Stick to the data as much as possible” 
We report the original values whenever they are available if they correspond to the year 2010 or 
the year t+30 in the original scenario. When this value is not available
5 we interpolated it. In both 
cases, shares for 2010 are then computed for all the recorded scenarios and a median energy 
portfolio share is computed across all the scenarios and for each of the three energy sources 
(nuclear, RE and fossil fuels).The same procedure is applied to t+30 figures. 
1.4) Extrapolate the real trajectories of primary energy consumption 
Where extrapolations or interpolations are needed, growth rates were used for each separate 
primary energy component. Thus, each component is then allowed to grow to the target year at its 
own rate based on explicit or implicit growth trends.
6 Then all components are totaled and shares 
are computed for the given year. 
1.5) Retain the broadest primary energy base possible 
Energy studies do not always report the same total primary energy consumption. The most 
important difference lies in whether the study incorporates biomass and traditional energies: 
commercial energy only without biomass, commercial energy + biomass, commercial energy and 
total traditional energy. In all cases we use the broadest definition of primary energy originally 
presented in the scenarios. This means that when traditional energy and biomass are present, we 
use the total primary energy consumption including them to compute the shares to 2010 and t+30. 
This leads to the last step of our methodology. 
1.6) Special attention to renewable energy 
The renewable energy shares displayed are defined in a narrow sense: excluding biomass, waste 
and traditional energy. Obviously, under this narrow definition, the share of RE in primary energy 
consumption will be lower. Note that this narrow definition essentially covers the market-oriented 
RE systems like solar, wind or hydraulic RE. On some occasions it was not possible to compute 
the narrow RE share from available data, so the figures originally reported in the studies are 
given. Finally, most scenarios (especially the older ones) do report very broad categories of RE 
technologies like hydraulic, other RE and biomass + traditional energies. We always stick to the 
original level of detail, according to the policy of section (1.3). 
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2) Synthesis of the results; two perceptible trends and a “noise” 
The results of our investigation are reported as a gallery of graphs depicting various exploratory 
visualizations of the data. The full set of data is given in table 2 in the annex. 
The graphs are scatter plots of the projected energy portfolio for all scenarios as a function of the 
year of publication which appears on the horizontal axis for all the graphs. A scatter plot is given 
for each energy source’s share both for 2010 and t+30. Additional graphs help detecting trends in 
expectations. In those plots, the same symbols represent each energy forecasting project so that a 
project may be easily identified in the graph. Choosing the date of publication as the abscissa is 
the key step to reveal the change over time of the experts’ outlook for the future. 
The data depicted in the graphs are given in table 2 of the annex of this document. Graphing all 
the scenarios would have the advantage of comprehensiveness. For reasons given above, we 
report the median shares for each study, across its various scenarios – except for the IPCC SRES 
scenarios. For the latter, we report the median shares for each of the six different energy models. 
For each energy source we report sets of four graphs. The first covers both 2010 and t+30 and 
displays energy projects with symbols, and distinguishes studies focused on the US by depicting 
them as squares of different color. A second set does not distinguish by source or geographic 
coverage and focuses on uncovering trends in the forecasted shares according to the date of 
publication, for both 2010 an t+30. 
2.1) Fossil energy: the resilience of growing trends in market shares 
In figures 1 and 2, the median fossil energy shares are displayed for 2010 and t+30 for all the 
energy studies considered. 
This statistic gives an aggregate measure of the changing technological optimism regarding our 
ability to substitute away from fossil energy. As time passes, projections are less and less 
optimistic: studies published in the 1970s envision fossil fuel shares between 55% and 65% of 
primary energy, whereas those published in the 1990s show an increase in the projected share of 
fossil fuels, leading to a convergence of forecasts of the fossil fuel share around 80%. 
This result, as will be seen in the following section, is largely due to the downward-creeping 
assessment of the potential for nuclear energy and this is confirmed in figure 2 where we show 
the evolution of the predictions at t+30 years from the reference year. 
After 1990, we witness a quasi stabilization of projections of the fossil fuel primary energy share 
in t+30 (figure 2) between 70% and 90%. But, in forecasts published starting from 2000, just 
after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, one can see a return to a greater optimism, though it is 
still modest, with estimates of decarbonization only in the range of 20% to 30%. Figure 1 
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Figures 3 and 4, for both 2010 and t+30 respectively, help to sketch out a more broad-brush view 
of the trends. To show out these trends we first used a regular linear regression line (in solid red) 
along with the regression equation (shown next to the graph legend) and in a second step we 
added an interpolation (the thin dashed black line) by a robust Tukey smoother.
7 This smoother is 
robust in the sense that it is insensitive to outliers, unlike the common linear regression line. In 
addition, the Tukey smoother provides insights about the existence of any trend in the data, as 
well as the trend’s nature (linear or not), while allowing a quick assessment of the degree of 
linearity present in the data. John W. Tukey designed it as one of the many easily computed 
statistics of the Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) methodology aimed at revealing patterns in 
data (Tukey, 1977). 
The increase in the fossil energy share is shown by both trend lines. Concerning the linear 
regression, the fit is moderate (R² = 0.51) but significant. Meanwhile the Tukey smoother is not 
far from the regression line. However, contrary to the linear regression line whose slope is by 
construction constant, the Tukey smoother tells a two-period story: a gradual increase of the fossil 
fuel shares up to the early 1990s, followed by a peak around 1995, and then followed by a 
gradual decrease: the peak share dropped from 90% to 8 % in the most recent studies. 
The upward (i.e., increasingly pessimistic) linear trend is still visible but far less pronounced than 
in figure 3 (R² = 0.25) because of the more scattered set of forecasted fossil fuel shares in t+30, as 
compared to the 2010 forecasts. The same remark about the regular regression and Tukey 
smoother trends apply here. 
 
                                                 
7 It very clearly shows a trend towards pessimism that accelerates in the middle of the 1980’s and then reverses in the 
post Kyoto years. Figure 3 
Forecasted fossil energy share in 2010 according to the year of publication Forcasted share =
















































Forecasted fossil energy share in t+30 according to the year of publication Forecasted share = 













































 2.2) Renewable energy: a persistent noise 
 
The striking feature in the evolution of renewable energy (RE) shares in figures 5 and 6 is the 
persistence a very large dispersion of the results in all years even when we only use the median 
shares of each study. 
 
One can certainly register in the t+30 scatter plot an increase of both the level and variance of the 
projected RE shares, together with, remarkably, great stability over time in the pessimistic results 
(e.g., IEA estimates through the 1990s and 2000s) and, on the other hand, an increase in the upper 
bounds of the projections (e.g., Shell International). To try and discern some trends in this almost 
shapeless set of data points, we report again in figures 7 and 8 the linear regression line and the 
robust Tukey smoother, for 2010 and t+30. 
 
The linear regression shows an absence of time correlation (R²~ 0.0) for the 2010 projections and 
an almost insignificant one for the t+30 projections, (R² = 0.12) and twice as low as the t+30 fit 
for the share of fossil fuels (R² = 0.25, figure 4). 
In fact, the seeming trend towards more optimistic views about RE (whereas this trend was 
downward oriented for the 2010 time horizon) might well simply result from an increase over 
time in computational capacities and the growing tendency of studies to explore more in depth a 
wider range of contrasting scenarios. 
The robust Tukey smoother, although confirming the absence of clear trends allows for sketching 
interesting indications. For the 2010 scatter plot, an upward trend culminates in the RE shares of 
studies published in the 1980s, followed by a downward revision of the forecasts for RE in the 
studies published in the 1990s, before a sudden surge in optimistic scenarios around 2000 and a 
subsequent decline around 2006. 
The similarity of these 2010 and t+30 dotted lines seems to clearly indicate a lagged correlation 
in technological beliefs with the oil price movements: studies published in 1983-1985 have been 
launched during or just after the second oil shock and studies published in the nineties have been 
launched during a period of low oil prices. Studies published in 2000 seem to be influenced by 
the Kyoto Protocol which spurred optimism about carbon free energies. 
 Figure 5 


































Department of the Interior EUOGEP Energy Research and Development Agency European Union / DGTREN
Ford Foundation Greenpeace Harvard Business School IEA
IIASA IPCC OECD PEW
Shell International BV Union of Concerned Scientists WEC WEC and IIASA











































Department of the Interior EUOGEP Energy Research and Development Agency European Union / DGTREN
Ford Foundation Greenpeace Harvard Business School IEA
IIASA IPCC OECD PEW
Shell International BV Union of Concerned Scientists WEC WEC and IIASA




Forecasted RE energy share in 2010 according to the year of publication Forecasted share =



































Forecasted RE energy share in t+30 according to the year of publication Forecasted share = 

































 2.3) Nuclear energy: an unsurprising downward reassessment 
 
Let us now turn to nuclear energy, which was viewed in the early 1970s as the most likely large 
scale substitute to oil. 
 
Both figures 9 and 10 confirm the technological optimism of the 1970s about nuclear energy. The 
early US forecasts may seem extreme but the forecasted nuclear share is also quite high for 
worldwide energy studies of the same period: IIASA and OECD projected a median share of 
nuclear energy in 2010 of 40% and 25%, respectively, and though for t+30 the shares forecasted 
by IIASA and OECD are far lower than the US studies’, they are still quite high. This optimism 
for nuclear energy gradually fades during the 1980s, stabilizing during the 1990s at around 5% of 
primary energy. Whereas we just saw that there is large variation between 2010 and t+30 for 
fossil and renewable energy, we can note for nuclear a remarkable convergence of the forecasted 
shares: from 1990, a consensus emerges around 5% for both 2010 and t+30. 
The linear regression gives a reasonable fit but which is less informative than the Tukey smoother 
indicator which shows out, unsurprisingly for those who know about the history of the debates 
about the non-military uses of nuclear energy, two distinct periods: the first period encompasses 
the 1970s and 1980s, when the projected shares of nuclear fall sharply. The second period starts 
at the end 1980s when the trend is totally flat, i.e., around a stable consensus level which only 
translates the feeling of a continued ban of this energy in many parts of the world. 
The same conclusions hold for t+30 with the notable difference that the linear fit is less steep due 
to a greater dispersion in this scatter plot. The two periods described in figure 11 seem to be 
magnified in this figure: there is more dispersion in the first period and less in the second. The 
decreasing slope of the linear regression lines is thus less in absolute value: 0.71 vs. 0.81 in figure 
11. The fit is moderate in both figures (R² = 0.64 and 0.63, respectively) but acceptable.  
 Figure 9 
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 3) Discussion and conclusion 
The preceding analysis of 37 energy forecasting studies and their 116 scenarios shows how long-
term visions of the structure of the energy supply evolved over a period spanning almost 35 years. 
The first striking feature is that the 1970s technological optimism about our ability to switch 
away from fossil fuel (fossil fuels were projected to have only a 50-70% share in total primary 
energy at t+30) decreased significantly in the 1990s (a share of 75-90%), likely influenced by the 
long period of relatively low oil prices after 1985. The slight recovery of optimism in the last 5-
10 years (70-80% share of fossil fuels) seems correlated with the rise in oil prices. A potential 
change in worldviews after Kyoto seems very low up to 2005, a logical consequence of the Bush 
administration’s neglect of Kyoto (figure 13). 
The decline in technological optimism is unsurprisingly correlated with a decline in modelers’ 
belief in the suitability of nuclear power, with projections of the share of nuclear power dropping 
from a high of 20-35% in the 1970s to around 5% in the last two decades (figure 14). This decline 
shows that modelers internalized public concerns about nuclear power and did not envisage a 
reversal of public opinion; furthermore, the period of low oil prices after 1985 did not offer a 
strong argument that the economic advantage of nuclear power outweighed the concerns. 
The case of renewable is more intriguing as a trend of increasing optimism from the early 1970s 
to the mid 1980s (with the share rising from about 2% to 10%) was followed by a period of great 
uncertainty, as shown by the subsequent large range in projected shares (4-12%, figure 15). Also, 
a group of renewable optimists has emerged in the last decade predicting a higher share of 
renewables in the next 30 years. The influence of Kyoto, which was not significant for fossil fuels 
and nuclear, is more clearly detectable for renewables, with more optimistic studies launched in 
the late 1990s and published in 2001 and 2003. The rise in oil prices supported this reassessment 
of the role renewable energies but no study predicts a drastic acceleration of their penetration. 
The apparent conservatism that emerges from this retrospective is a message to be considered in 
debates around climate policies. Indeed, whereas the relative stability of the structure of the 
energy supply over thirty years is not surprising given the inertia of energy systems, here we 
investigate long-term visions of the world, and technical inertia cannot explain why the projected 
prospects for shifting away from fossil energies have been so stable since the early 1980s. 
Historically, the promises of generous technical change on the supply side were not fulfilled in 
the case of the nuclear energy, nor in the case of new and renewable energies, for which projected 
shares were not upgraded during more than three decades. 
This pessimism cannot obviously be extrapolated for the future but the above analysis is a 
reminder of the false impression of the ease of substituting for fossil fuels, an impression that 
emerges in long-run energy forecasting. That a large scale option can be broken by a sudden rise 
of public concern is not unique to nuclear energy (as we now see for carbon sequestration and for 
the impacts of wind energy on landscapes); in the same way efforts on new and renewable 
energies can be discouraged by periods of low energy prices and be made unsuccessful by too 
large a spectrum of options. Our concluding message is that the optimism necessary to mobilize 
efforts to develop low carbon energy supply should not be used to divert attention away from 
efforts to modify the dynamics of the energy demand nor from the enforcement of policies 
necessary to create stable carbon prices and encourage the taking of investment risks. Figure 13  
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Annex 
Table 1 summarizes the energy forecasting projects included in this report. The table reports the 
project name, the supporting institution, the geographic scope, and respectively, the years of 
publication, reference, and forecast, and, finally, the number of scenarios in the project. 
We define an energy project as a self-contained study realized by a sponsoring institution for a 
given purpose and published at a given year. Under this definition, the IEA World Energy 
Outlooks constitute different projects because they are published at different years. The same is 
true of the IPCC emissions scenarios. One project comes along with a set of scenarios. 
Thus we have a total of 32 energy projects with a total of 116 scenarios. The geographic scope is 
the world for 26 projects, the US for 5, and the EU for 1. Excluding the IPCC scenarios, there are 
30 projects and 74 scenarios. The years of publication range from 1972 to 2008, thus spanning 36 
years of energy forecasting. 
Table 2 summarizes the complete dataset that is displayed in the graphics. 
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Table 1: Summary of Energy Projects Incorporated 
 








Unites States Energy though 
the Year 2000 
Department of the Interior  US  1972  1972  2000  1 
Energy Policy Project  Ford Foundation  US  1974  1973  2000  6 
National Energy R&D plan  Energy Research and 
Development Agency 
US 1975  1972  2000  6 
Workshop on Alternative 
Energy Strategies 
IIASA World  1977  1975  2000  4 
Facing the Future  OECD  World  1979  1975  2000  1 
Energy Future in the USA  Harvard Business School  US  1979  1979  2000  1 
Energy in a Finite World  IIASA  World  1981  1975  2030  4 
World Energy Council 1983  WEC  World  1983  1978  2020  2 
World Energy Council 1986  WEC  World  1986  1980  2020  2 
Energy for a Sustainable World  EUOGEP  World  1988  1980  2020  2 
World Energy Council 1993  WEC  World  1993  1990  2020  4 
WEC-IIASA95  WEC and IIASA  World  1995  1990  2020  6 
Shell Energy Needs and 
Possibilities 
Shell International BV  World  2001  2000  2025  2 
Shell Energy 2008  Shell International BV  World  2008  2000  2030  2 
Shell Global Scenarios 2025  Shell International BV  World  2005  2005  2025  3 
US Energy Scenarios for the 
21st Century 
PEW US  2003  2000  2035  6 
Greenpeace Energy Revolution  Greenpeace World  2008  2005  2050  2 
Union of Concerned Scientists  Clean Energy Blueprint 
Scenario 
US 2001  2000  2020  2 
European Energy and 
Transports 
European Union / 
DGTREN 
EU 2006  2000 2030  3 
World Energy Outlook 1993  IEA  World  1993  1990  2010  1 
World Energy Outlook 1994  IEA  World  1994  1991  2010  1 
World Energy Outlook 1995  IEA  World  1995  1992  2010  2 
World Energy Outlook 1996  IEA  World  1996  1993  2010  2 
World Energy Outlook 1998  IEA  World  1998  1995  2020  1 
World Energy Outlook 2000  IEA  World  2000  1997  2020  1 
World Energy Outlook 2002  IEA  World  2002  2000  2030  1 
World Energy Outlook 2004  IEA  World  2004  2002  2030  1 
World Energy Outlook 2006  IEA  World  2006  2004  2030  2 
World Energy Outlook 2007  IEA  World  2007  2005  2030  2 
World Energy Outlook 2008  IEA  World  2008  2006  2030  1 
IS92 IPCC  World  1992  1990  2025  6 
IPCC SRES  IPCC  World  2000  1990  2030  36 
 Table 2: Project Details and Computed Forecasts for 2010 and t+30 








Primary energy shares in 
2010 (c) 
Primary energy shares in 
t+30 (c) 
 Nuclear    RE   Fossils  Nuclear   RE   Fossils
Unites States Energy though the Year 2000  Department of the Interior  US  1972  1972  2000  1  42.0 2.5 55.3 45.7 2.3 51.8
Energy Policy Project  Ford Foundation  US  1974  1973  2000  6  31.0 5.0 64.0 19.2 5.1 75.7
National Energy R&D plan  Energy Rsrch & Dev Agency  US  1975  1972  2000  6  30.7 4.1 66.3 25.9 4.4 70.9
Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies  IIASA  World 1977  1975  2000  4  39.2 4.4 55.5 27.6 5.6 66.8
Facing the Future  OECD  World 1979  1975  2000  1  25.9 8.8 65.4 18.4 8.5 73.1
Energy Future in the USA  Harvard Business School  US  1979  1979  2000  1  36.5 3.0 60.5 34.7 3.1 56.0
Energy in a Finite World  IIASA  World 1981  1975  2030  4  13.4 8.1 78.7 11.6 7.7 80.7
World Energy Council 1983  WEC  World 1983  1978  2020  2  10.2 10.9 71.3 9.8 10.5 71.8
World Energy Council 1986  WEC  World 1986  1980  2020  2  9.6 10.4 72.6 9.6 10.4 72.6
Energy for a Sustainable World  EUOGEP  World 1988  1980  2020  2  4.6 4.4 55.5 4.6 4.0 75.7
IS92 IPCC  World 1992  1990  2025  6  6.7 8.3 84.8 7.7 9.6 80.4
World Energy Council 1993  WEC  World 1993  1990  2020  4  5.7 9.5 75.2 6.0 11.1 73.8
World Energy Outlook 1993  IEA  World 1993  1990  2010  1  6.0 4.1 89.9 5.4 4.5 90.1
World Energy Outlook 1994  IEA  World 1994  1991  2010  1  6.1 4.1 89.8 5.4 4.7 90.0
WEC-IIASA95  WEC and IIASA  World 1995  1990 2020  6  6.1 9.5 75.4 6.3 9.7 74.8
World Energy Outlook 1995  IEA  World 1995  1992  2010  2  6.4 3.8 89.8 5.5 4.4 90.1
World Energy Outlook 1996  IEA  World 1996  1993  2010  2  6.0 3.8 90.3 5.1 4.3 90.6
World Energy Outlook 1998  IEA  World 1998  1995  2020  1  5.3 3.0 82.9 4.2 3.5 84.5
World Energy Outlook 2000  IEA  World 2000  1997  2020  1  5.5 4.5 80.3 4.5 4.8 80.2
IPCC SRES (d)  IPCC  World 2000  1990  2030  36  3.3 4.5 85.1 5.1 5.6 81.1
SRES-AIM IPCC  World 2000 1990 2030 7 2.6 2.5 87.8 4.1 3.2 83.7
SRES-ASF IPCC  World 2000  1990  2030  4  2.6 3.3 93.8 3.0 4.1 88.1
SRES-IMAGE IPCC  World 2000  1990  2030  2  4.3 14.1 79.5 6.8 8.3 77.4
SRES-MARIA IPCC  World 2000  1990  2030  4  2.2 4.7 82.4 4.2 7.7 76.1
SRES-MESSAGE IPCC  World 2000  1990  2030  8  4.6 5.1 84.7 5.4 6.2 81.1
SRES-MINICAM IPCC World 2000  1990  2030  11  6.5 5.7 84.3 8.0 5.9 80.6
Shell Energy Needs and Possibilities  Shell International BV  World 2001  2000 2025  2  7.1 8.4 84.5 5.9 16.8 79.2
Clean Energy Blueprint Scenario  Union of Concerned Scientists  US  2001  2000  2020  2  7.0 8.8 83.8 3.2 10.8 85.9
World Energy Outlook 2002  IEA  World 2002  2000  2030  1  6.0 4.8 77.4 4.0 5.7 78.2
US Energy Scenarios for the 21st Century  PEW  US  2003  2000  2035  6  7.2 8.1 84.3 4.5 15.6 79.8
World Energy Outlook 2004  IEA  World 2004 2002 2030 1 6.4 3.1 80.2 4.8 4.2 81.5
Shell Global Scenarios 2025  Shell International BV  World 2005  2005  2025  3  6.2 8.7 85.1 4.9 14.0 81.1
European Energy and Transports  European Union / DGTREN  EU  2006  2000  2030  3  14.1 7.8 77.8 7.5 15.0 77.7
World Energy Outlook 2006  IEA  World 2006  2004  2030  2  5.8 3.9 80.9 4.9 11.0 73.3
World Energy Outlook 2007  IEA  World 2007  2005  2030  2  6.5 2.7 80.2 5.9 5.2 78.6
Shell Energy 2008  Shell International BV  World 2008  2000  2030  2  5.8 3.9 80.9 4.9 11.0 73.3
Greenpeace Energy Revolution  Greenpeace  World 2008  2005  2050  2  5.7 3.1 81.1 1.7 12.6 71.6
World Energy Outlook 2008  IEA  World 2008  2006  2030  1  6.2 3.0 80.6 5.1 5.2 80.0Notes: 
(a) the energy projects are sorted by increasing date of publication, as in the figures of the main text; 
(b) the year of forecast reported here may differ from the original one, especially for the IPCC scenarios; as said in the methodology section, we 
retained forecasts not beyond 2050; 
(c) the reported shares are the median shares across all the scenarios of each energy project; 
(d) the IPCC SRES scenarios are reported according to the median projections of each the six model runs; we also included the whole of IPCC 
SRES scenarios as an extra data point. 